

XUCHAO GAO

Department of Economics
270 Bay State Road, Room 515
Boston Massachusetts 02215 USA
Cell: (984) 377-9383
Email: xcgao@bu.edu
Web site: <https://xuchaogao.github.io>

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2025 (expected)
Dissertation Title: *Essays in Labor and Urban Economics*
Dissertation Committee: Kevin Lang, Daniele Paserman and Benjamin Marx

M.A., Economics, Duke University, Durham, NC, 2018

B.A., Agricultural Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China, 2016
Exchange Program, UC Davis, CA, 2014-2015

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Labor Economics, Urban Economics, Development Economics

WORKING PAPERS

“Single by Choice or Rejection? Evidence on Mating Preferences in China” October 2024.
Job Market paper.

“The impacts of population mobility controls on housing prices: Evidence from the 2014 household registration reform in China,” October 2023.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Network job and worker benefits of rural urban migrants in China,” October 2020.

PRESENTATIONS

Applied Microeconomics Dissertation Workshop, Boston University, 2020-2024
Development Reading Group, Boston University, 2020

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Dean’s Fellowship, Boston University, 2018-2023
Tuition Scholarship, Duke University, 2016-2018
Scholarship for undergraduate exchange program, Renmin University of China, 2014-2015
Scholarship of Academic Excellence, Renmin University of China, 2013-2016
National Scholarship for undergraduate, China Education Ministry, 2012

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Professor Marjorie McElroy and Professor Seth Sanders, Duke University, 2017-2018

Co-organizer, Development Reading Group, Fall 2020

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Empirical Economics II, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2022
Teaching Assistant, Empirical Economics II (EC204), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2019, Spring 2020, Fall 2020, Spring 2021, Fall 2023, Fall 2024
Teaching Assistant, Empirical Economics I (EC203), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2022, Fall 2022, Spring 2023
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomics Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2021, Summer 2023
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Macroeconomics Analysis, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 2022, Summer 2023
Academic Tutor, Introductory Microeconomics Analysis, Summer 2017

LANGUAGES

English (fluent), Mandarin (native)

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, R, MATLAB, LaTeX

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS: China/F1

REFERENCES

**Professor Kevin
Lang**

Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-5694
Email: lang@bu.edu

**Professor Daniele
Paserman**

Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617) 353-5695
Email: paserman@bu.edu

**Professor Benjamin
Marx**

Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: (617)-353-4123
Email: bmarx@bu.edu

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Single by Choice or Rejection? Evidence on Mating Preferences in China (Job Market Paper)

In China, the marriage rate increases with education for men but decreases for women. However, we observe positive assortative matching, as in most countries. This pattern is inconsistent with some simple models of marital matching. If there were strict educational homogamy, highly educated women would have high marriage rates because they would be on the short side of the market. If everyone preferred the most skilled mate, low-education men but not high-education women would have low marriage rates. If women preferred high-skill spouses but men preferred low-skill spouses, we would not observe positive assortative mating.

In this paper, I ask what preferences can explain the observed mating pattern for individuals born between 1972 and 1975. I allow their utility from marrying to depend on their education and their spouse's education. The utility function allows for a discrete jump and different slope if the wife's education exceeds the husband's. In addition, each person has an idiosyncratic preference for each potential spouse. I assume utility is nontransferable and solve the equilibrium assuming a deferred acceptance algorithm.

I find that men, particularly those with low education, are strongly averse to marrying more educated women. In contrast, women's preferences with respect to their spouse's education are more or less flat. The model fits the high single rate among low-education men and high-education women. Moreover, when I predict earlier cohorts' marriage rates, I closely fit the pattern for low-education men but not high-education women. This suggests that some important change in tastes or matching technology played a significant role in the decrease in marriage among these women.

The impacts of population mobility controls on housing prices: Evidence from the 2014 household registration reform in China

The household registration system (Hukou system) in China largely restricts individuals' access to the social welfare system outside their hometown. This makes it costly and inconvenient for migrants to live in the receiving cities. Most migrants do not consider purchasing a house where they work if they cannot obtain local Hukou. In this paper, I study the effects of a 2014 Hukou reform on urban housing prices. The reform significantly relaxed the registration system, making it more feasible for migrants to purchase housing. Using housing data at the apartment complex level, I find that the reform increased prices of lower-quality residential properties while lowering those of higher quality. This is consistent with prior findings that more migrant workers move to places where controls are relaxed, which spurs demand for basic housing but may suggest some native flight at the upper end.

Network job and worker benefits of rural urban migrants in China

Despite the rise in rural-urban migration since the 1980s, many migrants remain unaware of or are denied labor benefits to which they are entitled. The lack of transparency about worker benefits and the high mobility of the migrant workforce may exacerbate this situation. Using Chinese rural-urban migration data, this paper studies whether jobs obtained through social networks provide better worker benefits. My results suggest that network jobs tend to be associated with worse benefits. I discuss the potential explanations for this pattern. Furthermore, I find that migrants' decision to stay in urban areas is influenced more by housing benefits than other forms of worker benefits.